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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 12-3328 
______________ 
 
HEATHER HAGAN, INDIVIDUALLY; 
S.H., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH 
HER PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN, 
HEATHER HAGAN 
 
v. 
 
ROCHELLE BILAL; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 
 
Heather Hagan; S.H., 
                                                                          Appellants 
          
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-11-04343) 
Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 25, 2013 
 
BEFORE:  JORDAN, GREENBERG, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  April 29, 2013) 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
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 This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from a summary judgment 
entered in the District Court on July 20, 2012, in favor of defendants Rochelle Bilal, a 
Philadelphia police officer, and the City of Philadelphia.  Plaintiffs-appellants Heather 
Hagan and her infant daughter S.H., however, limit their appeal to the summary judgment 
in favor of Bilal and thus the City is not a party to this appeal.  Inasmuch as there is no 
dispute of material fact the only issue that we address is whether the District Court 
correctly granted Bilal summary judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the 
undisputed facts.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 
2004).  The parties agree that we should exercise plenary review on this appeal, citing 
Dilworth v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 418 F.3d 345, 349 (3d Cir. 2005); McGreevy v. Stroup, 
413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005).
1
 
 The undisputed facts in this case are troublesome.  On October 7, 2009, Hagan 
was driving an automobile in a northerly direction on Broad Street, a principal roadway 
in Philadelphia, near Girard Avenue, a major cross street.  She intended at that time to 
make a left turn across the southbound lanes of traffic on Broad Street to enter a parking 
area at St. Joseph’s Preparatory High School to pick up her stepson at the school.  The 
proposed turn, however, was illegal, as traffic regulations did not permit a left turn at the 
point that Hagan intended to make it. 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over the Hagans’ federal 
claims and had supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over their related 
state law claims.  The Hagans, however, have abandoned their state law claims and thus 
we are not concerned with those claims on this appeal.   
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 As it happened, Bilal, who was off-duty, at that time was in the vicinity operating 
a private automobile on Broad Street and observed that Hagan intended to make an illegal 
left turn.  Bilal, however, was not in uniform and therefore Hagan could not identify her 
as a police officer from her appearance.  But inasmuch as Bilal intended to stop Hagan 
from making the turn she orally identified herself as a police officer and, while still in her 
automobile, told Hagan that if Hagan made the turn she would give her a ticket.  At that 
time Hagan asked to see Bilal’s identification but Bilal refused to produce it, apparently 
because she believed that she did not have to produce her identification as she was off 
duty.  Hagan then made her turn into the school parking lot and Bilal followed her into 
the lot in her own automobile, parking behind Hagan thus blocking Hagan’s automobile 
in the lot.  After Hagan and Bilal parked their automobiles, when Hagan asked to see 
Bilal’s identification she still did not produce it. 
 After the cars were parked, notwithstanding Hagan’s illegal left turn, Bilal did not 
arrest Hagan or issue her a traffic ticket.  On the other hand, Hagan did not attempt to 
drive out of the parking lot.  Rather, Hagan and her daughter entered the school building 
from which Hagan called the Philadelphia police on the 911 number.  Uniformed police 
then arrived and gave an oral warning to Hagan about the illegal turn at which point the 
incident seemed to be closed. 
 But the incident was not closed as Hagan brought police department disciplinary 
proceedings against Bilal that ultimately were not successful.  Thereafter, the Hagans 
instituted this action against Bilal and the City, asserting both federal and state law 
claims.  On this appeal, however, the Hagans only are pursuing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
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Fourth Amendment constitutional claim against Bilal predicated on Bilal having made an 
illegal, excessive, and unreasonable seizure of them.  Both in the District Court and here 
Bilal has contended that the Hagans’ Fourth Amendment claims were not meritorious as 
Bilal did not seize them.  In its opinion the District Court did not determine if there had 
been a seizure.  Instead, it indicated that even if Bilal had seized the Hagans, an event that 
the Court believed could not have happened until Bilal blocked the Hagan automobile 
after Hagan parked, the seizure would have been “neither unreasonable nor excessive and 
therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment.”  App. at 34.  Accordingly, the Court 
granted Bilal summary judgment.
2
  This appeal followed. 
 As we indicated above we find this case troublesome.  We can understand why 
Bilal did not want to produce her identification while the automobiles were on Broad 
Street as the identification process could have obstructed traffic.  Yet once Hagan and 
Bilal drove their automobiles into the school parking lot Bilal should have produced 
identification for Hagan had every right to be certain of the identity of the person 
confronting her as sometimes people impersonate police officers.  In this regard, we see 
nothing in Bilal’s brief justifying her failure to produce identification once the 
automobiles were parked.   
 The above said, there simply was no seizure in this case so this Fourth 
Amendment action cannot succeed.  We recently pointed out in James v. City of Wilkes-
Barre, 700 F.3d, 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks, citations and 
                                              
2
 Bilal claimed qualified immunity as a defense but the District Court did not consider 
that defense as it ruled in favor of Bilal on the merits of the Hagans’ claims. 
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parentheses omitted), citing and quoting many cases, including some from the Supreme 
Court that:  
[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, 
has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen, may we conclude that a 
seizure has occurred.  A person is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes 
only if he is detained by means intentionally applied to terminate his 
freedom of movement.  When a person claims that her liberty is restrained 
by an officer’s show of authority, a seizure does not occur unless she yields 
to that show of authority. 
 
   In this case nothing Bilal did on Broad Street affected Hagan’s movements as 
notwithstanding Bilal’s directions not to make a left turn Hagan pulled into the school 
parking lot just as she had planned to do before her encounter with Bilal.  Furthermore, 
even though Bilal parked her automobile in a way that would have obstructed Hagan 
from leaving the lot in her automobile had she sought to do so immediately after parking, 
we see no reason to believe that her intentions with respect to her movements prior to 
encountering Bilal were curtailed or changed by Bilal’s actions as Hagan intended to park 
and then enter the school building just as she did.  Overall, it is clear that Bilal did not 
restrain the Hagans’ freedom of movement and therefore there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the order of July 20, 2012, will be affirmed.  The 
parties will bear their own costs on this appeal. 
 
